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Abstract. We believe that distrust can be as important as trust when agents are
making a decision. An agent may not trust a source because of lack of positive
evidence, but this does not necessarily mean the agent distrusts the source. Trust
and distrust have to be considered as two separate concepts which can coexist.
We are aware that an adequate way to take this fact into account is by considering
explicitly not only the agent’s degree of trust in a source but also its indepen-
dent degree of distrust. Explicitly taking distrust into account allows us to mark
a clear difference between the distinct notions of negative trust and insufficient
trust. More precisely, it is possible, unlike in approaches where only trust is ex-
plicitly accounted for, to “weigh” differently information from helpful, malicious,
unknown, or neutral sources.
1 Introduction and Motivations
Interaction is fundamental in a multi-agent system, allowing agents to cooperate to
achieve their goals. When interchanging information, the extent to which a rational
agent changes its beliefs may depend on several factors, like, for example, the trustwor-
thiness of the agent providing new information, the agent’s attitude towards information
coming from unknown agents, or agents the agent knows as being malicious, or agents
the agent knows as providers of usually correct information, and so on.
The main lack in most existing works on trust or using trust is the way the con-
cept of distrust is implicitly considered, that is, as the complement of trust (trust =
1 − distrust). However, things are not always so simple. Trust and distrust may derive
from different kinds of information (or from different sides of the personality) and,
therefore, can coexist without being complementary [4, 9, 15]. For instance, one may
not trust a source because of lack of positive evidence, but this does not necessarily
mean (s)he distrusts it. Taking distrust explicitly into account allows an agent, e.g.,
to avoid dropping a goal just because favorable information comes from an unknown
agent (neither trusted nor distrusted) — the absence of trust does not always mean full
distrust.
We believe that an adequate way to take these facts into account is by considering
explicitly not only the agent’s trust degree in other agents but also its independent de-
gree of distrust. The trustworthiness of a source can be represented as a (trust, distrust)
pair, and intuitionistic fuzzy logic [1] can be used to represent the uncertainty on the
trust degree introduced by the explicit presence of distrust.
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Example John thinks his house has become too small for his growing family and would
like to buy a larger one. Of course, John wants to spend as little money as possible. A
friend who works in the real estate industry tells John prices are poised to go down. Then
John reads in a newspaper that the real estate market is weak and prices are expected to
go down. Therefore, John’s desire is to wait for prices to lower before buying. However,
John later meets a real estate agent who has an interesting house on sale, and the agent
tells him to hurry up, because prices are soaring. On the way home, John hears a guy
on the bus saying his cousin told him prices of real estate are going up.
We will see below which degrees could be assign by John to these different sources
of information. Note that here, although numerical, the source degrees have only an
ordinal significance.
2 Related Work: From Trust to Distrust
2.1 From Trust . . .
The term trust has a variety of meanings in the literature [14]. Demolombe [5] defines
trust as a mental attitude of an agent with respect to another agent. He considers the
agent’s attitudes as a sort of belief about some property about another agent. He started
by proposing a definition of trust as a binary concept (an agent trusts or does not trust
another agent); then he introduced the notion of graded trust which is more suited to
representing real situations where trust is perceived as less rigid. He also proposed a
formal defintion for both trust with respect to topics and conditional trust.
Definition 1 (trust with respect to topics)
The fact that an agent a trust the agent bwith respect to prop for the topic t, Tpropa,b(t),
is defined as follow:
Tpropa,b(t) ≡ ∀“p′′(A(t, “p′′)→ Tpropa,b(p),
where A(t, “p′′) means that the sentence named by “p′′ is about the topic t.
The justification for this first proposal is that in general an agent trusts another agent
for all the propositions related to a given topic.
Definition 2 (Conditional Trust)
The fact that an agent a trust the agent b for p in the circumstances represented by q,
Tpropa,b(p|q), is defined as follow:
Tpropa,b(p|q) ≡ Ka(q → prop(p)),
where prop(p) is any property about p.
The justification for this second proposal is that, in real life, there are many situa-
tions where an agent trusts another only in some particular circumstances. This is called
for example, context-awareness trust [17] or decision trust [11].
Castelfranchi and Falcone [2] claimed that trust is much more than a subjective
probability and pointed out to the necessity for a cognitive view of trust as a complex
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structure of beliefs (and goals) determining both a “degree of trust” (instead of a simple
probability factor) and an estimation of risk. However, they expressed their awareness
that in some situations, it should be important to consider the absolute values of some
parameters independently from the values of the others. They present the following jus-
tification to this claim [7]: “For example it is possible that the value of the damage
per se (in case of failure) is too high to choose a given decision branch, and this inde-
pendently either from the probability of the failure (even if it is very low) or from the
possible payoff (even if it is very high). In other words, that danger might seem to the
agent an intolerable risk” .
Inspired by Castelfranchi and Falcone, Jøsang and colleagues [11] argued that an ex-
plicit distintion between context-independent trust, (which they called reliability trust),
and context-dependent trust, (which they called decision trust), should be done when
using the term trust. They adopt the definition proposed by Gambetta [8] as the defini-
tion of reliability trust.
Definition 3 (Reliability Trust)
Reliability trust is the subjective probability by which an individual, A, expects that
another individual, B, performs a given action on which its welfare depends;
and before introducing the concept of decision trust, they propose the following exam-
ple which can help us to understand the difference between reliability trust and decision
trust:
Consider a person who distrusts an old rope for climbing from the third floor of a house
during a fire exercise. Imagine now that the same person is trapped in a real fire in the
same house, and that the only escape is to climb from the third floor window with the
same old rope. In a real fire, most people would trust the rope. Although the reliability
trust in the rope is the same in both situations, the decision trust changes as a function
of the utility values associated with the possible courses of action.
Decision trust is then defined as:
Definition 4 (Decision Trust)
Decision trust is the extent to which a given party is willing to depend on something or
somebody in a given situation with a feeling of relative security, even though negative
consequences are possible.
The relation between trust and risk in decision making is also considered by Jøsang
and Lo Presti in [10]. They propose one of the first models for trust in which a relation
between trust and risk is considered explicitely. Their paper analyses the relationship
between the two concepts by first looking at how a decision is made to enter into a
transaction based on the risk information.
2.2 . . . to Distrust
While some researchers believe distrust simply means a low level of trust, others believe
distrust is a concept entirely separate from trust. Here, we propose a non-exhaustive de-
scription of some works which share to some extent our viewpoint on trust and distrust.
3
Lewicki and colleagues [12] proposed a theoretical framework for understanding
simultaneous trust and distrust within relationships. They assert that both trust and dis-
trust involve movements toward certainty: trust concerning expectations of things hoped
for and distrust concerning expectations of things feared. Like us, they belong to the
thinking school which considers that trust and distrust are separate but linked dimen-
sions, but not necessarly the opposite ends of a single continuum. Indeed, the elements
which contribute to the growth and decline of trust can be different from those which
contribute to the growth and decline of distrust.
Griffiths [9] shown how agents can use trust to manage risk when cooperating. He
proposed an approach which (i) uses fuzzy logic to represent trust and distrust; and
(ii) allows agents to reason with uncertain and imprecise information regarding other’s
trustworthiness. He claimed that distrust is not simply a negation of trust, but rather, an
explicit belief that an agent will act against the best interest of another. This is in line
with Lewicki and colleagues’ opinion and also with our opinion. The difference from
our opinion is that we consider that distrust should not be always perceived as a reason
to necessarily associate malicious intentions to the trustee. In case of interaction with a
neutral trustee, that is, when the weight of the trustor’s reasons to trust is the same as
the weight of the trustor’s reasons to distrust, automatically associating malicious (or
helpful) purposes to the trustee would not be fair. In that case, decisions should be taken
based upon other parameters. For example, an optimistic trustor would underestimate
the reasons to distrust: “an optimist is one who will look for the best in those with whom
s(he) interacts”[13]. A pessimistic trustor instead, would underestimate the reasons to
trust.
McKnight and Cheverny [15] argued that trust and distrust are separate constructs
that may exist simultaneously. They claimed that “distrust is not only important be-
cause it allows one to avoid negative consequences, but because general distrust of
other people and institutions is becoming more prevalent which means that it may, to
an extent, be displacing trust as a social mechanism for dealing with risk. Indeed, un-
der certain conditions, distrust may already be more useful or beneficial than trust.”
They underline that “without properly defining trust and distrust, it would be hard to
tell which is more important and when.”
3 Towards an Explicit Representation of Distrust
Existing computational models usually deal with trust in a binary way: they assume
that a source is either to be trusted or not, and they compute the probability that the
source can be trusted. However, sources can not always be divided into trustworthy and
untrustworthy in a clear-cut way. Some sources may be trusted to a certain extent. To
take this fact into account, we think that trust and distrust should be represented as fuzzy
degrees.
3.1 Basic Considerations
Fuzzy sets, introduced by Zadeh [19], are a generalization of classical sets obtained by
replacing the characteristic function of a set A with a membership function µA, which
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can take up any value in [0, 1]. Let X be the universe of discourse and x ∈ X . The
value µA(x) or, more simply, A(x) is the membership degree of element x in A, i.e.,
the degree to which x belongs in A.
In [1], Atanassov extended the fuzzy set theory by introducing Intuitionistic Fuzzy
Set (IFS for short) theory. In fuzzy set theory, it is implicitely assumed that the fact that
an element x “belongs” with a degree µA(x) in a fuzzy set A, follows that x should “not
belong” to A to the extent 1− µA(x). An intuitionistic fuzzy set F , instead, explicitely
assigns to each element x of the considered universe both a degree of membership
µF (x) ∈ [0, 1] and one of non-membership νF (x) ∈ [0, 1] which are such that:
µF (x) + νF (x) ≤ 1.
Obviously, when µF (x)+νF (x) = 1 for all the elements of the universe, the traditional
fuzzy set concept is recovered.
Deschrijver and Kerr showed in [6] that IFS theory is formally equivalent to Interval
Valued Fuzzy Set (IVFS) theory which is another extention of fuzzy set theory in which
the membership degrees are subintervals instead of numbers from [0, 1] [18]. The IFS
pair (µF (x), νF (x)) corresponds to the IVFS interval [µF (x), 1 − νF (x)], indicating
that the degree with which x “belongs in F is ranged from µF (x) to 1 − νF (x). They
defined the hesitation degree, h ∈ [0, 1], as the length of such an interval. It is given
by h = 1 − µF (x) − νF (x). The longer the interval, the more doubt about the actual
µF (x) value.
3.2 The Trustworthiness of a Source
The trustworthiness of a source (or of another agent) may be defined as, [4]:
Definition [Trustworthiness of a Source]
Let t ∈ [0, 1] be the degree of trust the agent has in a source, and d ∈ [0, 1] be its
degree of distrust in the same source. The trustworthiness of that source for the agent is
represented by pair (t, d), whith t+ d ≤ 1.
Following Deschrijver and Kerr’s viewpoint, the trustworthiness (t, d) of a source
corresponds to the interval [t, 1 − d], indicating that the trust degree can range from t
to 1 − d. Therefore, the hesitation degree h = 1 − t − d represents the uncertainty,
or doubt, about the actual trust value. E.g., if a source has trustworthiness (0.2, 0), this
means that the agent trusts the source to degree 0.2, but possibly more, because there
is much doubt (h = 0.8). More precisely, it means that the agent may trust the source
to a degree varying from 0.2 to 1. Instead, if the trustworthiness is (0.6, 0.4), the agent
trusts the source to degree 0.6 but not more (h = 0).
Thanks to these considerations, we can represent the trustworthiness of a source
more faithfully than as it is proposed in existing approaches. For example, we can ex-
plicitly represent the following cases of trustworthiness:
(0, 1): the agent has reasons to fully distrust the source, hence it has no hesitation (h = 0),
(0, 0): the agent has no information about the source and hence no reason to trust the
source, but also no reason to distrust it; therefore, it fully hesitates in trusting it
(h = 1),
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(1, 0): the agent has reasons to fully trust the source, hence it has no hesitation (h = 0).
As we can see, by considering both (and not neccessarily related concepts) trust and
distrust, it is possible to differentiate between absence of trust caused by presence of
distrust (e.g., information provided by a malicious source) versus by lack of knowledge
(e.g., as towards an unknown source).
The sources can be classified in:
– helpful source: a source for which the reasons to believe in are stronger than the
reasons to reject its information;
– malicious source: a source for which the reasons to reject its information are stronger
than the reasons to believe it;
– unknown source: a source which never provided information to the agent before;
– neutral source: a source which provided to the agent as much true information as
false.
Example Contiunued To sum up, John got information from four sources with different
scores. The first source is friendly and competent; therefore, its score is (1, 0). The
second is supposedly competent and hopefully independent: therefore, its score might
be something like ( 12 ,
1
4 ). The third source is unknown, but has an obvious conflict
of interest; therefore John assigns it a score of (0, 1). Finally, the guy on the bus is
a complete stranger reporting the opinion of another complete stranger. Therefore, its
score cannot be other than (0, 0).
4 Summary and Perspectives for a Normative Multiagent System
Taking distrust explicitly into account can help when making decisions in a situa-
tion where the agents are collaborative, that is, those which are considered as helpful
sources; wary, which are suited to contexts where competition is the main theme; and
utility-driven, for which a gain corresponds to a loss for its counterparts.
It would be interesting to take these considerations into account in the case of a
Normative Multiagent System, where the behaviour of an agent depends on its internal
components but also on the society it is part of.
Luck and colleagues [16], for example, proposed to analyse the agent’s behaviour
(reasoning) thanks to a three-dimensional space model, Figure 1, with motivations (axis
x), norms (axis y), and trust (axis z). Each vertex in the space represents a kind of
society. In particular, an increase in the value of x represents a prevalence of malicious
motivations, indicating that agents are more likely to defect if they see more utility in
alternative interactions; an increase in the value of y indicates the prevalence of stricter
norms and enforcement which can constraint the motivations of agents and prevent
them from acting maliciously if they intend to do so; finally, an increase in the value of
z indicates an increase in the trust that agents place in other agents and, therefore, an
increase in willingness to cooperate with others.
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Fig. 1. Three-dimensional space model with norms, motivations and trust.
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